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Writing a Basic Law or a Constitution represents a significant
moment in defining a country's identity. For Palestinians, it is a
particularly complex process as the discourse of the Basic Law is
narrated under the limitations of the Oslo Accords and subjected
to future negotiations. Thus, the destiny of the Palestinians is far
from secure. Despite the postcolonial character of the debates
about the Basic Law and the prosaic character of its text, it chal-
lenges the Palestinian legacy of colonialism and occupation.
Through this engagement with these "Others," the reconstruction
of Palestinian identity takes shape.
The process of drafting a constitution is an important moment
of self-affirmation for any society, affirming its collective right to
t This paper was presented at the Middle East Studies Association 31st Annual
Meeting held in San Francisco, November 22-24, 1997. I would like to thank Ahmed Me-
hdi for his care in discussing with me the changes to the various drafts made by the Pales-
tinian Legislative Council's last text, and to Beverley Brown for her instructive comments
on the essay as a whole.
* School of Law, University of East London, United Kingdom <j.strawson@uel.
ac.uk>.
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self-government according to its own laws. In the Fall of 1997, the
Palestinian Legislative Council I adopted the third reading of the
Basic Law and moved Palestine closer toward possessing its own
constitution. As the preamble makes clear,2 adopting the Basic
Law for the Palestinian Authority is a phase of the struggle for
self-determination led by the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). Moreover, it paves the way for adopting a permanent con-
stitution for a Palestinian state.
This article's primary focus is the role that drafting the Pales-
tinian Basic Law plays in defining Palestinian identity. The proc-
ess of drafting the text has both legal and cultural implications.
This article is also concerned with the details of the Basic Law.
The Oslo Accords constructed another Palestine in the twen-
tieth century.3 Today, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
represents a new incarnation of people subjected to a series of co-
lonial occupations in the twentieth century.4 The Oslo Accords,
however, presents a double edged sword for Palestine and Pales-
tinian identity because it simultaneously affirms and undermines
the rights. The elliptical formulas about "legitimate rights" in the
Oslo Accords and general ambiguity regarding the legal character
of Palestine, however, leave two credible interpretations of the
agreement. The interpretations are either: (1) a step towards self-
determination or (2) a betrayal of that right. 5 Whatever the long
term consequences of the process, Oslo has opened a new phase in
the quest for Palestinian identity. The phase is one in which the
1. For the powers and the composition of the Palestinian Legislative Council, see
THE PALESTINIAN COUNCIL (Jerusalem Media & Communications Center 1996).
2. See BASIC LAW FOR THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD (Jerusalem Media & Communications Center, 1996) [hereinafter BASIC LAW].
3. See Declaration on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-
P.L.O., 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Oslo Agreement]; see also Israel-Palestine Liberation
Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O., 33
I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Cairo Agreement]; Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II), Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 650 [hereinafter
Interim Agreement) (further implemented by the Agreement on Hebron and the accom-
panying "Note for the Record," Jan. 17, 1997). For an Israeli-Palestinian academic ex-
change on the Oslo Accords, see EUGENE COTRAN AND CHIBLI MALLAT, THE ARAB-
ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1996).
4. For a review of the legal issues of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, see JOHN
QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990).
5. See Eugene Cotran, Some Legal Aspects of the Declaration of Principles: A Pal-
estinian View, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 67-77 (Eugene
Cotran et al. eds., 1996) (asserting the former); see also EDWARD W. SAID, PEACE AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (1995) (asserting the latter).
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quest for identity has moved from outside Palestine, to inside Pal-
estine.6 The change in location created space for developing Pal-
estinian self-legitimacy by writing a Basic Law.
7
Oslo forced the Palestinians to discuss the immediate impera-
tives of government and the practical issues associated with the
development of a legal system.8 These problems do not, however,
arise within the normal context of people taking their first steps
towards self-determination. Rather, the Palestinian situation op-
erates in very particular conditions.
Oslo created the PNA, but provided it with a patchwork of
territorial and jurisdictional units. Thus, basic assumptions, which
governments usually rely on, do not apply. For example, territory
that the Palestinians control is divided into small "fully autono-
mous" areas. Area A consists of approximately 70% of the Gaza
strip and 4% of the West Bank.9 Area B consists of 26% of the
West Bank, which has a Palestinian civil administration, but not
full security control.10 These areas are not contiguous, and despite
agreements, a safe passage between the areas does not exist.
This territorial layout not only hampers economic life, but
also makes simple administrative tasks difficult. For example,
school inspectors cannot freely move from one area to another.
As a result, Palestine began creating its political and legal institu-
tions in significantly more difficult circumstances than most other
ex-colonial territories.
6. This location change is significant. Until 1993, Palestinians as an occupied people
inside Palestine had great difficulty asserting their identity. This was left by force of cir-
cumstances to the Palestinian Diaspora. After 1993, the Diaspora was marginalized with
the shift of the PLO from an organization in exile to an organization in office in Gaza.
For a sensitive reading of the pre-1993 period, see Glenn Bowman, A Country of Words:
Conceiving Palestine from a Position of Exile, in THE MAKING OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES
138-70 (Ernest Laclau ed., 1994).
7. Many drafts of the Basic Law exist. I am working from two published English
texts. See BASIC LAW, supra note 2; see also manuscript draft dated August 28, 1996, and
from the text which has received its third reading by the Palestinian Legislative Council
(1997).
8. See Nabil Sha'ath, The State in the Making: An Interview, 3 PALESTINE-ISRAEL J.
POL., ECON. & CULTURE 25-34 (1996).
9. The West Bank is divided into Areas A, B and C for the purposes of redeploy-
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The process has many uncertainties, including whether a State
will exist and if so, the location of its boundaries.11 By drafting a
Basic Law under these circumstances, the Palestinians face the
task of writing a narrative which has more significance than the
usual constitutional instrument. They are both writing a legal nar-
rative and etching a vital part of their identity.
II. CONSTITUTIONS
Societies take command of their own legitimacy by writing a
Basic Law or Constitution. 12 Emerging from four centuries of Ot-
toman rule, followed by the British Mandate and Israeli Occupa-
tion, Palestine's Basic Law can become part of the grand narrative
of self-determination. 13 To date, Palestinian identity has been
submerged under waves of conquests. These conquests have rele-
gated Palestinians to a secondary status in their own home and al-
ienated their land through legal codes imposed by the various oc-
cupying powers. 14 The game of imperial power has consumed the
people and land, and immersed every aspect of culture in colonial
11. See Jeff Halper, Resolving the Conflict: The Nation-State and Nation in Is-
rael/Palestine, PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. POL., ECON. & CULTURE 1997, at 65-72; see also
Netanyahu Presents his "Allon Plus" Final Status Map, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn
1997, at 126-28; Prime Minister Benjamnin Netanyahu, Address to the Council of Jewish
Federations General Assembly in Indianapolis, THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPORT, Nov. 17,
1997 (discussing the question of boundaries has assumed a greater importance in the Is-
raeli Prime Minister's thoughts, both public and leaked, as he attempts to sell his idea of a
Palestinian mini-state).
12. Constitutional law has a position in western jurisprudential lineage often seen as a
product of the European enlightenment. A rich jurisprudence of governance beyond the
western purview, however, is now coming into vision. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1995). The relevant
Islamic jurisprudence can be found in the works of siyar and siyassa. See MAJID
KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI'S SIYAR (1966); see also
ABDU'L-HASAM AL MAWARDI, THE ORDINANCE OF GOVERNMENT (Wafaa H. Wahiba
trans., 1996).
The Islamic revival has produced some important work in this field. For an inci-
sive review of Islamlist ideas, see Ahmad S. Mousalli, Modem Islamic Fundamentalist
Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy, in 1 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 79-119 (Augustus Richard Norton ed., 1995); see also, ABDULLAHI
AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARDS AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992); CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF
ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-SADR, NAJAF AND THE SHI'IT INTERNATIONAL
(1993) (reviewing the Shi'ite contribution).
13. See generally MUSA MAZZAWI, PALESTINE AND THE LAW (1996).
14. See Assaf Likhovski, In Our Image: Colonial Discourse and the Anglicization of
Law in Mandatory Palestine, 29 ISR. L. REV. 291,299-300 (1995).
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values. 15 These values, which take shape in the architecture, lit-
erature, administrative systems and law have become so estab-
lished, they appear as unquestionable formations of Palestinian
identity.
Much of the postcolonial debate involves an attempt to grap-
ple with the consequences of a process which conveyed the colo-
nized onto the terrain of the colonizers.16 This debate margins the
topic of law and imbues it with a variety of features, portraying it
as an objective system with neutral norms beyond the scope of cul-
tural critique. This apparently un-contested character of Palestin-
ian legal culture makes this objective picture all the more insidious
and allows this image of law as a supra-culture to seep into the
postcolonial panorama.
European colonial powers knew law was decisive in securing
their occupation. They created a legitimizing mechanism more
subtle than a direct assertion of power.17 Given the colonizing role
of law, the colonial powers inserted a Trojan horse into their
colonies which, by degrees, replaced existing methods for legiti-
mizing governance.' 8 For Palestine, European colonialism arrived
comparatively late in the form of the British Mandate. Nonethe-
less, it rapidly occupied the legal culture. Despite its short dura-
tion (1919-1948), British colonialism bequeathed an important
postcolonial legal inheritance. 19 Palestinian society engages this
history by writing a Basic Law which repatriates its legitimacy.
III. PALESTINE
The condition of Palestine makes writing a constitution a sui
generis affair. Other societies have not faced this situation, and no
ready comparisons exist. Former European colonial territories in
Africa and Asia also faced the problematic tasks of writing consti-
tutions for virtually new nations created during the late 1940s
15. See id at 300-01.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 302-04.
18. See id.
19. See Likhovski, supra note 14, at 292-359 (discussing the role the British Mandate
in bringing the direct application of a European legal system to Palestine). Furthermore,
it can be argued that the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code (1858) and the Mejelle
(1874) saw the indirect influence of a European system (French) which inspired the
methodology not the norms of those reforms. See id.
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through to the early 1960s.20 Their common colonial past and the
campaign for independence, however, had a powerful effect in
constructing their national identities. Despite political struggle
and negotiations, a clear understanding of the objectives and terri-
torial dispensation existed.21 Palestine has none of these certain-
ties.
South Africa has been compared with Palestine, perhaps be-
cause both conflicts reached an important stage in the 1990s.22
The two cases, however, are radically different.23 For example, the
character of South Africa and its borders were never in doubt.
The African National Congress, once legalized, successfully nego-
tiated a transitional constitution and the conditions for the April
(Liberation) Election in 1994. This transitional constitution served
as a bridge to creating the basis for free South African people to
draft their own constitution. 24 The African National Congress ar-
gued that South Africans could not freely develop their own politi-
cal system until they were free from apartheid. 25 After the elec-
tions, the people could freely choose their own form of
government.26 This explains the insistence that the pre-election
constitution, adopted in 1994, could only be transitional because
it's adoption occurred under the previous racist regime.27 After
the elections, the Constitutional Assembly framed the final consti-
tution in conditions free from the tyranny of apartheid.
The legal framework which created the political environment
leading up to the South African elections demonstrates the differ-
ence in conditions from Palestine. 28 South Africa's transitional
phase premised itself on a known starting point and a known des-
20. See Hugh Corder, Towards a South African Constitution, 57 MOD. L. REV. 491,
492 (1994).
21. See id.
22. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Future State of
Palestine, in PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS (1994).
23. On the character of South Africa from the liberation perspective, see MARIA
VAN DIEPEN, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 4 (1988).
24. For a discussion on the process of drafting the interim constitution of 1994, see
Corder, supra note 20.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. For a discussion of the politics of the negotiations, see HERIBERT ADAM &
KOGILA MOODLEY, THE NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION: SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN POST-
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA (1993).
28. See Corder, supra note 20, at 506.
416 [Vol. 20:411
Palestine's Basic Law
tination. Palestine's transitional phase, however, is more complex
because disagreements exist on both the point of departure and
the object of the journey. Israeli insecurities only recently allowed
their leaders to utter the words "Palestine" and "Palestinian." The
latter description of the West Bank remains a contested one for
the Israeli 'national camp,' which insists on using the designation
"Judea and Samaria," or at best, "the territories.
29
By the 1990s, the South African liberation movement could
deal with a white minority which had given consent to a new
democratic dispensation within South Africa in the 1992 referen-
dum. The subsequent negotiations concentrated on the modalities
of creating an inclusive, multi-national, multi-language and multi-
cultural order. In the Israel/Palestine case, each national narrative
attempted to deny the validity of the other. The Oslo Accords
created the possibility that in formally recognizing each side, the
basis of replacing conflicting narratives with relational ones ex-
isted. Inequality between the parties, however, necessarily means
the Israeli national narrative tends to be dominant. At each stage,
the peace process appears dependent on Israel's unilateral acts and
its recognition of Palestine.
Palestinians, however, have taken the initiative outside of this
dependency and engaged in a significant discourse of state building
by writing a Basic Law. The Palestinian National Council adopted
a resolution following the formal Declaration of Independence
3°
and asked the Legal Committee to carry out the task.31 Thus, the
Palestinians decided to draft a constitutional document outside the
scope of the Oslo Accords. In 1993, the Executive Committee of
the Palestine Liberation Organization discussed a draft and initi-
ated a wider discussion.32 In February 1994, the Jerusalem Media
and Communications Center (JMCC) organized a conference to
present a second draft.33 Organizations of Palestinian civil society
29. See NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, IMAGE AND REALITY OF THE ISRAEL-
PALESTINE CONFLICT (1995).
30. Sometimes called the "Algiers Declaration" and adopted in 1988.
31. For a discussion of the significance of this instrument, see F.A. Boyle, The Crea-
tion of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301, 302-06 (1990); see also J. Crawford,
The Creation of the State of Palestine - Too Much Too Soon, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 307, 308-13
(1990).
32. See Anis AI-Qasem, Introduction, in DRAFT BASIC LAW FOR THE NATIONAL
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such as lawyers, political organizations, women's groups, and the
universities, contributed and actively engaged in constitutional dis-
cussions.
The Oslo process changed political reality for Palestinians.
After establishing the Palestinian Authority,34 the focus for a con-
stitution went beyond discussions regarding a political campaign
for a state to the regulation of a Palestinian central power author-
ity. As a result, formal institutions of the growing Palestinian
state, such as the Ministry of Justice, engaged civil society, and
made the process part of the formal structures of society. While
more conferences were organized after the January 1996 Palestin-
ian Legislative Council (Council) elections, the civil process be-
came the center for debate.
This intersection between Palestinian civil society and the in-
stitutions of the incipient Palestinian state reveals the strong influ-
ence which drafting a constitution can have in creating a sense of
identity. The Council's formal sessions and the seminars, confer-
ences, and commentaries of the various drafts, continue to play a
critical role in recasting Palestinian identity and in securing a con-
temporary reality for Palestinian polity.
IV. THE DRAFT BASIC LAW-NARRATIVE AND TECHNIQUE
The first chapter of the Draft constitutes a bold legal narra-
tive. Article two, which appears straight forward, reads: "The
Palestinian people is [sic] the source of all authority and shall ex-
ercise this authority, during the Transitional period, through the
legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the manner pro-
vided in this Basic Law.' '35
This simple statement both includes and possibly excludes
Palestinians. Reference to the transitional period and the institu-
tions it creates appears to limit the endowment of authority to the
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. In one brief article, the
Basic Law asserts and questions national identity. Millions of in-
habitants in the Palestinian Diaspora appear beyond its scope. 36
The Basic Law appears hostage to the negotiations which reserved
the refugees issue for the permanent status talks. At another level,
34. After May 4, 1994, the Authority became known as the "Cairo Agreement." See
id.
35. Draft of the Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority art. 2 (1996).
36. See id
[Vol. 20:411418
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however, it legitimizes the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza
as their own lawmakers and radically breaks with the silence of the
past. In the assertion of article two, the legal identity of a people
finds at least a hesitant voice.
The Basic Law draft consists of seven chapters and provides
for the establishment of organs for central and local government,
including the judiciary.37 The Draft also contains sections guaran-
teeing human rights and the rule of law. The text looks like many
regular constitutional documents combining the specification of
state organs with citizen rights. A critical aspect of the Basic Law
is the apparent limitation of the Palestinian citizens.
While concerned with implementing an interim self-
government, the Basic Law re-affirms an unchanged role for the
PLO in the wider Palestinian community. Article 5638 ensures the
Palestinian people will retain the benefits of the degree of legal
personality gained in the international arena in the past twenty
years.39 Article 56 provides:
This Basic Law shall apply during the transitional period, but
shall not affect the powers and duties of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and its organs including its powers to represent the
Palestinian people in foreign and international relations and rela-
tions with foreign governments and international organizations. 40
This clause indicates the dual legal regime that the Palestinian
leadership created in the interim period. It attempts to demon-
strate that the Oslo Accord does not detract from the gains the
Palestinian people made in their struggle for self-determination,
especially in the manner that the United Nations system has re-
corded.41 Thus, the apparent restrictions imposed upon the Pales-
tinian Authority in the Cairo Agreement and Oslo II on interna-
tional relations are overcome.42
37. See id.
38. See id. art. 56.
39. See id.
40. Draft of the Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority, art. 107 (1996).
41. See PAUL J.I.M. DE WAART, DYNAMICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN PAL-
ESTINE: PROTECTION OF PEOPLES AS A HUMAN RIGHT 145-46 (1994).
42. See Cairo Agreement supra note 3, art. V(2)(b), (c), reprinted in 33 I.L.M at 622.
The wording of the Cairo Agreement appears to limit the capacity of the PLO to act on
the international stage when doing so "for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority." Id.;
see also Interim Agreement, supra note 3, art. XI(5)(a), (b)-(c), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. at
650. The Interim Agreement contains no reference to the PLO, because its purpose is
transferring powers to the elected Council. In both agreements, wide areas of interna-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
All constitutional instruments have international implications
that provide the basis for sovereign expression. The Basic Law in
a literary alliance with the Oslo Accords deals with this issue. In
general, the Oslo Accords appears successful until the Basic Law
addresses human rights obligations.
The third draft contains an important shift in phrasing. The
rights and duties assigned to the "Palestinian Authorities," al sula-
tat al-falistiniya, used in the early versions, are now replaced with
the definite Palestinian Authority, al-sulta al-falistinya.43 Its use in
article 9 removes the previous ambiguity regarding the body as-
signed to uphold human rights and to whom the citizens can direct
claims.44 Post-Cold War constitutions contain such provisions, and
similar clauses appear in the constitutions of Eastern Europe and
those of the former Soviet Union.
There is much debate over the exact effect of these provisions.
The Palestinian Basic Law leaves room for conjecture because
most of the international instruments mentioned in article 8 re-
quire states as parties. 45 The effect of such a provision remains an
interesting legal question because the permanent status of the ter-
ritory is yet to be negotiated. The transitional character of the text
could undermine this important area of constitutional rights. If in-
ternational law does not recognize Palestine as a state, article 9
may have little legal reality.
Other drafted clauses include, a grand narrative designating
the flag and one establishing Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
These clauses make the reader aware that the simple legal tech-
nique of drafting a constitution reaches beyond drafting, and en-
codes the narrative of Palestinian statehood.46 Article III states
that, "during the Transitional Period the Palestinian Authorities
may set up the government headquarters in any other place in Pal-
estine." Naming Jerusalem as its permanent capital gives Palestine
a legal voice to a political struggle. By contrast, few other consti-
tutions name a capital because where such a capital might be is
tional activity which are usually associated with statehood are accorded to the Palestinian
Authority although these activities shall not be considered foreign relations. See Interim
Agreement, supra note 3, art XI(5)(a)-(c).
43. DRAFT BASIC LAW art.9 (1996).
44. Id
45. See International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360.
46. See DRAFT BASIC LAW arts. 8,3 (1996).
[Vol. 20:411420
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purely a matter of internal decision. The political realities in the
case of Palestine, however, necessitate the capital's inclusion in the
Basic Law.
The Basic Law perhaps sets out the destination for the Pales-
tinian people which the Oslo Agreements obscures. The Basic
Law registers the story of the Palestinian people in the text. For
example, it maps out the institutions of a state, its acceptance of
international human rights obligations, and names a capital.47 The
document is highly positivistic and seemingly ordinary in its struc-
ture, provisions, and institutions. At first glance, the reader might
be disappointed that it is not more radical either in content or in
methodology. In its ordinariness, however, the reader can begin to
appreciate the extraordinary challenge the Basic Law presents to
Israel and the Palestinian past.
The contradictory implications of the text's phrasing present a
series of theoretical and practical issues, which combine the Pales-
tinian dilemma with constitutional theory. In the period since
1945, the national liberation struggles effectively defeated Euro-
pean colonialism. The states created through colonial occupation
have seen a transfer of power, from the imperial elite to local poli-
ticians. These postcolonial states gained their independence and
adopted constitutions, which their former colonial rulers sup-
ported. Their constitutions reflected many social and political
characteristics of the constitutions the colonial powers adopted.48
Imperial powers, such as Britain, talked of how they had exported
a Westminster-type constitution. In reality, the former British
colonies discovered they adopted a constitutional model which
neither existed in Westminster nor was suitable for world-wide
purchase. The British-made constitutions eventually collapsed
within a few years.
47. DRAFT BASIC LAW intro. (1996).
48. This goes to heart of postcolonialism and the postcolonial character of the lan-
guage and knowledge that we use in addressing these issues. The adoption of constitu-
tions, the forms which they take, and the territories and peoples they constitute, affirm
colonial power by assigning identity in the contemporary world. The debates about the
type of constitutional forms, leaving aside the boundary issue, necessarily constitutes an
engagement with the hegemonic postcolonial discourse in which differences to it have
been explained as relative to it. It appears that an escape from the postcolonial can be
elusive. See Stuart Hall, When was "The Postcolonial?" Thinking at the Limit, in THE
POSTCOLONIAL QUESTION: COMMON SKIES, DIVIDED HORIZONS (lain Chambers &
Lidia Curti eds., 1996).
1998]
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The colonial heritage of the former British colonies includes
constitutional theory, legal systems, and most importantly, a new
colonial identity which overlays the pre-colonial identity. These
two issues become connected as legal cultures and symbols of
identity submerged in the new political order. The constitutional
instruments reflect the success of the occupying legal cultures,
which had been a necessary part of the colonial project. In occupy-
ing territory, the colonial power found it imperative to destroy the
centers of legitimacy which existed for the colonized people.
The colonization of legal cultures created a fundamental dis-
tinction in contemporary jurisprudence between occupying and
occupied legal cultures. Edward Said explains how Europe gained
a "superior location" through colonial occupation which has Euro-
peanized the location of all culture. 49 In the legal field, the Euro-
pean world views western law as universal, metropolitan and ad-
vanced, whereas, non-western law as local, indigenous, and
backward.50 Modernizing society represents the justification for
the occupation of legal cultures.51 This scheme uses fairly neutral
terms to describe the process. For example, "received law" po-
litely connotes the direct imposition of the colonial law. Direct
imposition is also occasionally described as a "legal transplant," a
benign, almost medical term. The occupied people's legal system
is more often described as "customary," "traditional," or even
"religious." Imposing colonial law was also justified as a remedy
for the deficiencies of the host society's legal culture. While some
norms of the occupied system may survive, particularly in the area
of personal status, the occupier's legal methodology often sub-
sumes these norms.
The invading legal system also frustrates the host culture's de-
velopment and dynamism. Moreover, the invading legal system
draws sectors of the host society into a new legal cadre, which ac-
cepts this new methodology and begins to think of its own system
as backward. In the case of Arab/Islamic legal narratives, the rich
juristic methodology of pluralistic discourse becomes neglected in
favor of western rules. Important jurisprudential questions, such
49. See EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 1, 7-28 (1978).
50. This is true for all cultural forms. See HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF
CULTURE (1994). See generally NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, COLONIALISM AND CULTURE
(1992).
51. See ALl IBN ABI BAKR, THE HEDAYA OR GUIDE: A COMMENTARY ON THE
MUSSULMAN LAWS, at xxvi (Charles Hamilton trans., 1791).
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as the concept of self-determination (umma) and the discourse on
legality (qanuni) and legitimacy (shara'iya) in the context of the
legal regulation of governance, become buried beneath a rigid
positivistic exposition of rules.
This effect can be seen in the field of constitutional law, be-
ginning in the late nineteenth century with the importation of
European constitutional ideas. 52 For most of the twentieth cen-
tury, European liberal or socialist doctrine has dominated consti-
tutional discourse in the Arab world. 53 Within Arab/Islamic line-
age, it appears as if a governance jurisprudence had never existed.
This was confirmed in 1947 when Pakistan declared itself to be an
Islamic State, but adopted a "Westminster-type" British constitu-
tion.
The same pattern appears in some of the literature on Pales-
tine. These Palestinians seek most examples of exhortations from
a range of western constitutions.54 The idea that Islam can make a
contribution to constitutional law or pluralism has generally been
dismissed. Adrien Wing contends that "in drafting the Basic Law,
Palestinians must confront the inevitable tension between the de-
mands of democracy and Islam."55 This view has such a long his-
tory within western jurisprudence that it is now presented as fact
rather than argument. 56 Legal Orientalism 57 developed a narra-
tive of Islamic law which either omits constitutional law and all
public law entirely, or construes it as irrelevant or too backward
for consideration.58
Wing's comparison between Palestine and South Africa
overlooks the Islamic contributions to South African liberation. It
also fails to recognize the radical Islamic ideas about democracy
and freedom that South African Muslims have developed.59
Where Wing concentrates on a negative balance sheet of women's
52. See ELI KEDOURIE, THE POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 53-56 (1992).
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., ADRIEN KATHERINE WING, DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
THE FUTURE STATE OF PALESTINE 23-30.
55. Id. at 25.
56. For a similar viewpoint, see ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS (1995).
57. See generally John Strawson, Islamic Law and English Texts, 6 LAW & CRITIQUE
21(1995).
58. See id.
59. See generally Farid Esack, QUR'AN, LIBERATION AND PLURALISM: AN ISLAMIC
PERSPECTIVE OF INTERRELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY AGAINST OPPRESSION (1997).
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position in Islam, Farid Esack, the South African Muslim thinker
and activist, talks about the "gender jihad." Esack argues that the
assault on women's rights comes from the "period of Muslim de-
cline."' 60 Thus, Islam as a whole necessarily makes an important
contribution to the Palestinian debate, more than the limited pro-
gram of Islamic organizations such as Hamas.61
A. The Intifada Against Postcolonial Law
The problem with writing the Basic Law in the context of
Oslo does, however, become clear. Oslo breaks the official silence
of a people, and assigns them an identity laced with conditions.
While the United Nations unambiguously talks about the uncon-
ditional right to self-determination, 62 the Oslo Accord talks coyly
of "legitimate rights." It appears to condition the legitimate rights
of the Palestinian people on their adherence to the Oslo Accords,
framed entirely as an "interim self-government. ' 63 Thus, writing
the Basic Law can be seen either as part of the constitutional proc-
ess of self-determination, or as an internalization of the condi-
tional right to "interim self-government." 64
The problem with the interim self-government framework is
that it forces people to write a Basic Law which measures up to the
Oslo Accords' expectations. This analysis construes the Basic Law
not so much as a repatriation of legitimacy, but rather as a post-
colonial element of confidence building' In this context, the Basic
Law represents an element of negotiations, and is presented to the
60. Id. at 240.
61. See ZIAD ABU-AMR, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA 128-29 (1994).
62. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Territo-
ries, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. GAOR, (1960); Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. GAOR (1970); Western Sa-
hara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 28-30 (Oct. 16); see also Legal Consequences for States of the Con-
tinued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Secu-
rity Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21). The law on self-determination of
peoples in the colonial context is quite settled and has been further clarified by the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Namibia Case and the Western Sahara Case. These cases
clarify an international consensus that a colonial regime contravenes the right to self-
determination, and that the people themselves must choose their own destiny through a
free expression of their will. See generally ANTONIO CASSESSE, SELF-DETERMINATION
OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995) (discussing the history, development and
operation of the principle of self-determination).
63. See Oslo Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl., art. III, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1525.
64. See DRAFT OF BASIC LAW intro. (1996).
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Israeli government as evidence of the Palestinian Authority's good
governance practices. The Basic Law also serves to sway Israeli
public opinion in favor of the Palestinians.
It is precisely at this point that Palestine's colonial heritage
becomes quite clear. The British mandate clearly attempted to
limit Palestine's constitutional horizons.65 As Norman Bentwich,
the Legal Advisor to the government of Mandatory Palestine,
made clear:
It was recognized by Great Britain and by the Council of the
League [of Nations] that, on account of the special purpose of
facilitating the establishment of the Jewish National Home,
there could not be at once democratic government but the
process must be developed in stages. The mandatory therefore
directed to secure the development of self-governing institu-
tions and to encourage local autonomy. But the Arab majority
could not be allowed uncontrolled legislative power to prevent
the fulfillment of the Mandate in relation to the minority Jewish
population.6
6
The Oslo Accords' wordings reflect Bentwich's stages ap-
proach. The entire interim self-government project is conditioned
on steps towards self-government on small plots of land integrated
into a specified time frame. 67 The Declaration of Principles (Oslo
I) provides for the Palestinian Council election and the transfer of
responsibilities from the Israeli Military Government and Civil
Administration in these controlled stages. 68 Oslo I provides that
Palestinians will be able to gain a measure of control over
"education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and
tourism. ' 69 Oslo II provides that these powers will then be ex-
tended with the Legislative Council election, which took place in
January 1996.70 This incremental approach, which denies the Pal-
65. NORMAN BENTWICH, ENGLAND IN PALESTINE 88-89 (1932). This book is con-
sciously evocative of Milner's book on Egypt. See generally ALFRED MILNER, ENGLAND
IN EGYPT (1892).
66. BENTWICH, supra note 65, at 88-89.
67. See Oslo Agreement, supra note 3, art. VI(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1525; In-
terim Agreement, supra note 3, arts. IX, XVIII, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. at 650.
68. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on In-
terim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525
(entered into force Oct. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
69. Id. art. VI(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1525.
70. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, with Selected Israel Annexes, Sept. 28, 1995, arts. IX, XVIII,
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estinian people full power, even within tiny geographical areas,
confirms the Accords' postcolonial character.
These stages of autonomy treat the Palestinian people as if
they are not ready to exercise their rights. Moreover, these stages
have turned into examinations, which if passed successfully could
lead to other, unspecified destinations.71 These "other matters"
are left as subjects for discussion in the permanent status negotia-
tions. They will "cover the remaining issues, including: Jerusalem,
refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations
and cooperation with neighbors, and other issues of common in-
terest." 72
The openness of the process increases the conditional pres-
sures on the Palestinians. In the 1930's, the British colonial regime
expressed quite freely what this conditionality meant: "The gov-
ernment of Palestine, as in most countries is divided between cen-
tral and local authorities. In its central aspect it is a benevolent
autocracy. In its local aspect it includes representative and self-
governing bodies subject to a certain control and supervision of the
central authority."73 Perhaps only the word "benevolent" now ap-
pears out of place in what could be contemporary commentary.
Norman Bentwich was not alone in expressing these views
about governance and law in the 1920's and 1930's. Similar views
can be found in contemporary works and memoirs by colonial of-
ficials.74 On the importance of law to the colonial project, Sir Ro-
land Storrs wrote: "Pleasant as was the uncharted freedom of a
military governor and reluctant as any governor would be to cir-
cumscribe it, I soon began to feel, that unless I obtained good legal
advise, no subsequent Act of Indemnity could cover my irregulari-
ties. "75
Storrs' second legal advisor was Norman Bentwich, of whom
Storrs says, "I knew him at Cambridge and in Egypt, and cherished
an admiring friendship for an Israelite who, with all his talents, was
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim Agreement on the West Bank].
71. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 68, art. V(3), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at
1529-30.
72. Id
73. See BENTWICH, supra note 65, at 239.
74. See, e.g., HARRY CHARLES LUKE & EDWARD KEITH-ROACH, THE HANDBOOK
OF PALESTINE (1922).
75. ROLAND STORRS, ORIENTATIONS 354 (1937).
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without guile."' 76 The colonial regime saw law as both a practical
and ideological requirement. Law clothed the regime's power with
at least a thin layer of legitimacy.
Nonetheless, Palestine Parodies, a work that three High Court
judges "printed for private circulation," reveals the general con-
tempt felt towards colonial people and the legal order.77 The book
discusses legal and administrative themes, depicting both Arabs
and Jews as incompetent and corrupt.78 Furthermore, any claim to
freedom by either is seen as absurd.79 These colonial attitudes
persist.
In a Forward to a series of lowly colonial officials' memoirs,
Anthony Kirk-Greene comments on their work, "there was a
common feeling of a practical and useful task well done, although
some thought that more could have been achieved had independ-
ence come about more slowly."'80 In 1994, the first series entitled
Pasha of Jerusalem echoed these sentiments. 81 These attitudes
have been secreted within the Palestinian legal system and sus-
tained through educational projects, such as the Jerusalem Law
Classes. These classes set out to validate colonialist law at the ex-
pense of other legal culture.
These sentiments are linked to the Basic Law discussion be-
cause the Oslo Accords are framed with the legal methods of the
English common law system. This methodology is particularly
flexible. It is rooted in the development of principles through
conflicts, rather than in the attempt to use principles as a method
to solve conflicts. The Israeli legal system has inherited this meth-
odology. Moreover, it has marked the methodology in the Ac-
cords text through the open ended formulas, circular references
and general imprecision. 82
76. See id.
77. MUSTARD & CRESS, PALESTINE PARODIES: BEING THE HOLY LAND IN VERSE
AND WORSE (1938). Assaf Likhovski's article contains some discussion of this "work,"
but it is difficult to understand, as it is written in a style which the authors claim follows
A.P. Herbert, Lewis Carroll, Henry Graham and Kipling, which may have meant sense to
English public school boys of the 1930s. See Likhovski, supra note 14.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. EDWARD KEITH-ROACH, PASHA OF JERUSALEM: MEMOIRS OF A DISTRICT
COMMISSIONER UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE pmbl. (1994).
81. See id. at xv.
82. For example, such phrases as "within the terms of this agreement" are common.
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As Shehadeh points out, however, the French Civil Law sys-
tem has also guided the Palestinian legal community. The French
Civil system begins with principles, abstract formulations, and
codes which reconstruct the issues of a conflict.83 Joel Singer, an
Israeli legal advisor, explains that the ambiguities of the Declara-
tion of Principles provides Israel with wide discretion.84 Singer's
interpretation illustrates the English legal tradition's usefulness to
the stronger party.
The Declaration of Principles fully reflects the studied ambi-
guities of English law. For example, omitting definite articles in
the passages dealing with the Council's jurisdiction demonstrates
ambiguity. The jurisdictional provision reads, "Jurisdiction of the
Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip Territory."85 This
language renders the Council's potential scope of jurisdiction en-
tirely indeterminate. 86
Further ambiguities intrude into the territorial question over
the West Bank's areas A, B, and C, as divided by the Interim
Agreement. By creating conditions for the elections, Israel with-
drew from area A.87 The Interim Agreement stipulates, however,
that three further stages of re-deployment will occur three months
after the elections.88 The Agreement does not specify the scope of
these re-deployments. In addition, the Agreement does not con-
tain an explanation of the significance of the re-deployments for
areas B and C. As a consequence, it appears that Israel has com-
plete responsibility for deciding the territorial limits of the Coun-
cil's jurisdiction and the Palestinian authority. The English lan-
guage and English law create vagueness in the scope of Palestinian
jurisdiction over Palestine. With the Palestinian territories' issue
unresolved, Israel's obligations become minimal and apparently
unilateral.
Palestine's colonial history is stamped on its institutions and
way of thinking. In parts of Palestine, elements of British Mandate
83. See Raja Shehadeh, The Weight of Legal History: Constraints and Hopes in the
Search for a Sovereign Legal Language, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 3 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1996).
84. See Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Ar-
rangements: Some Legal Aspects, JUSTICE, Winter 1994, at 4, 5-6 (1994).
85. Id. at 7.
86. The Council is now the Palestinian Authority and the Legislative Council.
87. See Interim Agreement on the West Bank, supra note 70, appendix 1, reprinted in




law appear to remain in force. Birzeit Law Center indicates that
the task of determining the possible legal regime in force has been
difficult in both methodological and practical terms.89 The Center
has established an authoritative statement on laws in force at the
end of each legal period in the twentieth century. These periods
include the completion of the Ottoman, British, Egyptian (for
Gaza), Jordanian (for the West Bank) and the Israeli control in
Palestine. The Palestinians contribute to their own self-rule only
after 1994, and the creation of the Palestinian Authority.
After 1994, the Birzeit Law Center's project poses an impor-
tant challenge to Palestinian society. The project focuses on what
legal system is best in Palestine, rather than on the preferred legal
norms.90 In a contradictory way, the myriad of competing legal
systems within Israel offers a chance for Palestinians to take com-
mand of developing their own legal system. This occurs because
the former occupying powers did not leave behind a single system.
Because it is forced to make the choice, Palestine is a fascinating
case study of the liberation of law process.
Palestine's legal history has been marked by resistance to the
legal regime of occupying powers, particularly during the British
and Israeli periods. Since 1967, resistance has taken the form of
mass movements and legal challenges in the Courts, especially
against the land seizures by the Israelis.91 This resistance culmi-
nated in the "intifada," which began on December 9, 1987 and
ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords on September 13,
1993.92 The intifada provides the basis for the Oslo Accords and
the Basic Law. It represents the defining struggle of the Palestin-
ian people, forging a sense of unity between the peoples of the
West Bank and Gaza.93 In their rebellion against Israeli rule, Pal-
estinians created popular sources of legitimacy through the com-
mittees and organizations. The rejection of the Israeli occupation
89. Birzeit Univ. Law Center, Palestinian Self-governing Territories (visited Feb. 22,
1997) <http://www.birzeit.edu/law/Palestinian.html>.
90. See generally AY NIZAM QANUNI LI-FILASTIN? [WHICH LEGAL SYSTEM FOR
PALESTINE] (1996).
91. See RAJA SHEHADEH, THE LAW OF THE LAND: SETTLEMENTS AND LAND
ISSUES UNDER ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION (1993); see also RAJA SHEHADEH, THE
THIRD WAY: A JOURNAL OF LIFE IN THE WEST BANK, at vii (1982).
92. Judith Colp Rubin, Heavy Turnout Hands Arafat Election Victory, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1996, at Al.
93. See Sharon Moshavi, Mideast Tensions Up/Arafat Sets Strike, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29,
1996, at A7.
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and Israeli's largely English legal regime provides the source for a
new point of departure towards legitimacy.
V. RECONSTRUCTIONS
While withdrawals from a territory can be monitored and
tested, withdrawals from sites of cultural occupation present more
complex issues. A legal culture's liberation constitutes a moment
in the creation of identity. The legal culture's liberation requires a
reconstruction of law, and thus, mirrors and reinforces the process
of creating an identity.
The Basic Law's ordinariness rebels against the occupation of
a legal culture. By asserting the simple right of the Palestinian
people as the source of their own legitimacy, the text begins a
critical challenge. It, however, merely provides the basis for re-
constructing a legal discourse from the Palestinian diverse history.
Thus, it represents a beginning of the process.
The hybridity of Palestine's cultural formation allows for
many possibilities. The reconstruction of a Palestinian legal dis-
course does not involve recapturing an essentialist past.94 There is
no Palestinian avenue of legal lineage which can be walked along.
The colonial occupations of legal culture cannot be wiped away
leaving the original below. The Basic Law creates a new basis for
connection with legal lineage of Palestinian history. It allows a
new legal cadre to review the flickering images of those legal pasts
and to work with them anew.95
Restructuring Palestinian legal structure necessarily causes
reconstruction of the Palestinian identity. The legal history in-
cludes narratives of many Islamic colonial powers and the PLO.
In choosing between these various lineage, or by piecing them to-
gether, a Palestinian identity emerges. Constitutional texts do not
encapsulate a legal-historical moment which builds on a pre-
94. See Hillel Frisch, Modern Absolutist or Neopatriarchal State Building? Customary
Law, Extended Families and the Palestinian Authority, 29 INT'L J. MID. EAST STUD. 341,
353-54 (1997).
95. Many writings address these issues. See Fawaz Turki, Palestinian Self-Criticism
and the Liberation of Palestinian Society, 25 J. PALESTINIAN STUD. 2, 5-20 (1996)
(reviewing the days of "national unity"); NATASHA DUDINSKI & YASSER ABU KHATER,
THE PALESTINIAN LAW ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (1997); RA'ED ABDUL HAMID, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ASPECTS OF PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS 97 (1995); NATASHA DUDINSKI, RELIGION AND




existing settled identity. Instead, these texts narrate a more dy-
namic experience articulating, not merely regulation over power,
but those who are sovereign over it.96 It is in the selection of nar-
ratives that a contemporary expression of a sense of self becomes
apparent.
Emerging from colonial rule and occupation, societies cannot
return to an unsullied state of affairs. In the present postcolonial
period, former colonies are grappling with the consequences of a
system of world domination. This system has created boundaries,
assigned identities, and promulgated a system of knowledge. The
West has secluded itself firmly and successfully within the globali-
zation of knowledge that it claims to be universal. It accepts the
existence of other narratives as exceptions or relative to the
"universal." Law as a postcolonial culture becomes symbolic, as
indicated by the universal/relativist debate on human rights in the
international area.97 Interest in the other's legal system does not
change the overarching dominance of the western discourse. De-
cision to include or exclude other narratives reinforces its pivotal
methodology.
The same processes occur in constitution-making. For Pales-
tine, however, its hybrid colonial history necessitates a re-working
of a competing lineage, creating the possibility of what Kevin
Robins calls "an interruption. ' 98 "Cultural experience," he writes,
"is always the experience of the others: the others, the real others
are indispensable, transformational objects in historical change.
History is created out of cultures in relation and interaction: inter-
rupting identities." 99
In tabulating the layers of different legal cultures, Palestine
confronts the other cultures on many fronts. This multiple en-
gagement with the others takes place in discussions within Pales-
tinian civil society and within the state institutions. This popular
engagement interrupts the postcolonial impositions of the Oslo
Accords. The legal reconstruction redefines Palestinian identity.
96. See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan" Loyalty, Identity and Community in
Law and Practice, 90 A.J. INT'L L. 359 (1996).
97. See John Strawson, A Western Question to the Middle East Is There a Human
Rights Discourse in Islam, 19 ARAB STUD. Q. 31,49-50 (1997).
98. See Kevin Robins, Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe Questions of Cultural
Identity 59 (Stuart Hall & Pauldu Gay eds., 1996).
99. Id.
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Moreover, the narrative of the Basic Law reaches beyond the Ot-
toman Empire, British Mandate and Israeli occupation, and repa-
triates the legitimacy of Palestine. 100 These imperial powers have
constructed a Palestine which can now begin to construct itself.
100. For a discussion of the jurisprudential issues, see Nicola Lacey, Normative Re-
construction in Socio-Legal Theory, 5 Soc. & LEG. STUD. 131 (1996).
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